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TERRY DINAN* and F. REED JOHNSON**

Effects of Hazardous Waste Risks
on Property Transfers: Legal
Liability vs. Direct Regulation
ABSTRACT
Given the probable large number of sites contaminatedwith hazardous
wastes, there could be significant benefits from a statutory system that
effectively deters future contamination and encourages private remediation of existing sites. We compare the effectiveness of Superfund liability
rules with New Jersey's ECRA regulatory program to clean up contaminated sites at the time of property transfers. Our analysis indicates that
regulatory delays raise private costs under ECRA relative to Superfund
alone, but that external benefits of ECRA cleanup activities are greater
as well. Furthermore,it is likely that unmitigateddamages are less under
ECRA.
INTRODUCTION
Many areas of the United States are contaminated by hazardous substances. As of May 31, 1988, EPA's list of hazardous waste sites included
31,000 sites that are potentially in need of treatment.' About 1,200 of
these sites were listed on, or proposed for, EPA's National Priorities List
(NPL),2 making them eligible for government enforcement action or cleanup
under the Superfund remedial action program. The General Accounting
Office (GAO) has stated that EPA underestimated the number of sites that
may need remedial action. GAO estimated that a minimum of 130,000
sites should be considered potentially hazardous.'
The first major national response to the dangers associated with aban*Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
**Economics Department, U.S. Naval Academy, and Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Environ-

mental Protection Agency. Paul Locke and an anonymous referee provided useful comments on
earlier drafts. Leila Yim provided research assistance. The views expressed here are those of the
authors and are not to be attributed to the Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of
the Navy.
1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of the Administrator. A Management Review
of the Superfund Program (1989) (U.S. Govemment Printing Office 1989-623-682110263) [hereinafter Management Review).
2.The "National Priorities List," established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §9605 (a)(8)(B) (1982 and
Supp. V 1987) and codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300. Appendix B (1987) lists the sites that EPA intends
to address by conducting remedial action. See also Management Review, supra note I. at 2.
3. U.S. General Accounting Office, Superfund: Extent of Nation's Potential Hazardous Waste
Problem Still Unknown. RCED-88-44 (Dec. 1987).
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doned hazardous waste sites was the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA). 4 CERCLA provided the President with authority to make
4'responsible parties" pay for cleanup of sites contaminated by hazardous
substances.' It required that EPA compile the NPL, which lists sites in
need of remedial action. In addition, CERCLA set up a $1.6 billion
Hazardous Substance Response Fund to support remedial cleanups in
cases where responsible parties could not be held accountable, and for
responding to emergency situations involving hazardous substances.
CERCLA was reauthorized in 1986 with the passage of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). 6 SARA contains
extensive amendments, additions, and revisions to CERCLA. SARA also
is designed to raise the Hazardous Substance Response Fund to $8.5
billion over a five-year period.
Although the Superfund remedial action program has made some progress cleaning up sites, the magnitude of the task is formidable. By spring
1988, 36 sites had been cleaned up, with 26 of those actually removed
from the NPL, and remedies were under way at 400 more sites." A recent
review of the program notes that:
Superfund [is] the most far-reaching national engineering program
ever mounted without the benefit of a single field trial. In such a
program, the most important early products must necessarily include
learning. In that respect, after nine years of experience the most
important lesson may be that the Superfund program faces a workload
stretching well into the next century, and would do so even if everything had gone right from the very start."
The process of cleaning up sites through the Superfund program is clearly
slow and expensive.
Given the number of potentially contaminated sites and the time and
expense involved in cleaning up those sites through the Superfund program, there would be great potential benefits from a system designed to
deter future contamination and to encourage companies to undertake cleanup
themselves at existing sites. This article examines the effectiveness of
Superfund liability rules and a regulatory program adopted by the state
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. V 1987).

5. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). four classes of "responsible parties" are listed: the present
owner and operator of the facility, the past owners and operators of the facility at the time of disposal,
any person. including a generator, who arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at the facility; and the transporters of
the hazardous substances to the facility.
6. Pub. Law No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 10. 26, 29, &
42 U.S.C.).
7. Management Review, supra note I, at 3, 4.
8. Id. at 3.
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of New Jersey in motivating environmental cleanups at the time of property transfers. The legislation that defines the Superfund program (CERCLA and SARA) establishes liability rules. These liability rules guide
the enforcement actions that the government may take. However, the
direct effect of the liability rules on the ability of the government to take
enforcement actions exceeds the scope of this article. Instead, the focus
here is on the secondary benefits of these liability rules in motivating
cleanup at non-NPL sites and the costs that such liability concerns generate.
METHOD AND LIMITATIONS
This article will outline an approach for evaluating the environmental
benefits and costs associated with property transfers under federal liability
rules (defined by CERCLA as amended by SARA, hereinafter referred
to as "Superfund") and a regulatory approach to property transfers that
went into effect in New Jersey in 1984. New Jersey's property transfer
program is defined by the Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act
(ECRA)9 and its implementing regulations.' Ideally, one would compare
the value of the contamination either avoided or cleaned up under the
two statutes with the costs that are imposed, including cleanup costs,
information costs, delay and transactions costs, and costs associated with
any resulting market changes. Given the enormous information requirements of such a comparison, this article will explore a second-best approach.
First, the two statutes are described and the incentives to undertake
cleanup actions that they create for parties involved in property transfers
are analyzed. In addition, currently available information is used to draw
inferences about costs and cleanup actions associated with the two statutes. Finally, a framework for a more systematic analysis is developed
and suggestions for future research are provided. The inferences and
comparisons made here are based on currently available data, published
articles, and telephone interviews with environmental auditors ratherthan
on a systematic legal or economic analysis. The purpose is to provide
some initial insights and suggest an avenue for future research.
PROPERTY TRANSFERS UNDER SUPERFUND
CERCLA defines liability based on relationships to the hazardous substances present on a given piece of property. An individual may be held
liable if he/she falls into one of the four classes of responsible parties
9. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 13:1K-6-13:IK-13 (West 1989).
'Al N.J. Admin. Code §7:26B. reprinted in N.J. Reg. 2435(a) (1987).
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listed in the statute." Liability under CERCLA is strict, and joint and
several. 2'This means that it is not necessary to prove negligence in order
to impose liability, and each responsible party may be held liable for the
full amount of the response costs, 'including cleanup costs and damages,
regardless of their share in the creation of the damage. CERCLA provides
only three limited defenses to liability: (I) an act of God, (2) an act of
war, or (3) an act or omission of a third party other than someone whose
act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship with
the defendant.'
Purchasers of commercial and industrial property face the possibility
of being held liable for environmental damage caused by previous owners
since ownership provides one basis for liability under CERCLA. These
purchasers may be eligible for an exemption to liability under the third
party defense offered under CERCLA. A major barrier to this third party
defense, however, is the requirement that there be no contractual relationship with the person who made the omission. Buyers obviously have
a contractual relationship with sellers, and lenders enter into contractual
relationships with buyers. Therefore, the third party defense under CERCLA prior to amendment by SARA offered little protection from liability
to commercial and industrial property purchasers or to lenders involved
in these transfers.
SARA expanded this third party exemption by offering a possible liability exemption to purchasers through the "innocent landowner" provision. Congress expanded the third-party defense by redefining the term
"contractual relationship" to provide a defense for real property which
was acquired by a purchaser after the placement of the hazardous sub-,
stances. Purchasers are not liable if they can show that they "did not
know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance, being
released or threatened to be released, had been disposed of at that facility"
when they acquired the facility.'s
A prerequisite for obtaining the innocent landowner exemption is that
the buyer must conduct an environmental investigation. " [Tihe defendant
I . See supra note 4. These classes are referred to generally as "owner/op rators," "generators."
and "transporters." 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (Supp. V 1987).
12. See United States Y.Conservation Chem. Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20, 207,
20, 209 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 3. 1984). See generally, Note. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste
Litigation. 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1458, 1518 (1986).
13. Response costs are defined as the costs associated with responding to a release of a hazardous
substance. They include costs of cleanup, enforcement, testing and monitoring, and other costs. See
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co.. 619 F. Supp. 162, 186 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
14. Schwenke, An Overview of Issues of Landowner and Lender Liabilities. 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10. 361-64 (Sept. 1988). These defenses are found at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
15. 42 U.S.C. §9601(35)(A) (Supp. V 1987). Purchasers also must satisfy the requirements set
forth in § 9607(b)(3)(a)&(b) (1982); they must exercise "due car," and take precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions.
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(buyer) must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate
inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent
with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize
liability."' 6 A key question for commercial and industrial purchasers is
the meaning of "all appropriate inquiry." SARA states that when determining whether the requirement for "all appropriate inquiry" has been
satisfied, the courts will take into account several factors, including the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if contaminated, available information about the property, the obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the
ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection. 7 SARA
provides no detailed guidance for determining what constitutes "all appropriate inquiry," such as when or what types of environmental audits
are required. Thus, while SARA provides for potential relief from liability,
it places a significant burden on buyers to fulfill the "appropriate inquiry"
requirements. In addition, buyers are left with a significant amount of
uncertainty concerning what constitutes "appropriate inquiry."
Kraakman has recently analyzed a class of regulatory programs that
impose collateral liability on private "gatekeepers."'" Gatekeepers are
agents with a personal stake in the behavior of another party who prevent
misconduct by withholding support. Under certain circumstances such
agents as lending institutions, employers, accountants, and physicians
may act as gatekeepers. Superfund liability provides buyers and lenders
with an incentive to perform this role. Although they are not the primary
parties that caused the contamination or benefited from it, they may be
able to enforce cleanup by withholding a purchase offer or loan funds
until the contamination has been remedied.
One major issue is whether Superfund liability creates sufficient gatekeeping incentives to clean up a site to the socially optimal level.' 9 Ideally,
the penalty for inadequate gatekeeping should be equal to the associated
loss. The motivation of buyers and lenders to perform the gatekeeping
16. 42 U.S.C. §9601(35XB) (Supp. V 1987).
17. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the issue of appropriate inquiry, see Office of Policy,
Ptanning, and Evaluation, U.S Environmental Protection Agency, A Review of Selected Current
Practices in Property Transfer Assessments to Define "Appropriate Inquiry" Under the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (1988) (hereinafter Current Practices ReviewI. (Prepared by
Policy, Planning & Evaluation, Inc., Vienna, Virginia, and ENSR Corporation, Irving, California
under EPA contract No. 68-01-7252, October 31, 1988.)
18. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. Econ.
& Org. 53 (1986).
19. The "socially optimal level" is the level of cleanup that would occur if the incremental social
costs of cleaning up a site were equal to the incremental social benefits that the cleanup would
generate, regardless of the distribution of those benefits. A free market is likely to result in a suboptimal level of cleanup if the parties who hear the cleanup costs are different from the parties who
is high. The
receive the cleanup benefits and if the costs of negotiating between these two parties
New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 457 (. Eatwell & M. Milgate eds. 1987).
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role effectively may be influenced by such factors as their level of assets,
the probability that they will actually be held responsible for cleanup
costs and damages, and their ability to benefit from the sellers' failure to
cleanup contamination.
In cases in which the buyer is a small enterprise, the firm's total asset
value is the effective limit on liability. If assets are less than expected
social losses, Superfund liability may provide buyers with inadequate
gatekeeping incentives. In these instances, however, lenders may play an
effective role in promoting environmental audits and cleanups. Since
lenders are typically the "deep pocket" in a transaction involving a borrower (the lender's business partner), they potentially may be held liable
for the total social cost of the damage. ' Recent court cases in which
lenders have been held responsible for environmental cleanup costs validate lenders' concerns about an increase in their exposure to risks."
Lenders have, in fact, played an increasingly important role in promoting information collection on environmental contamination in conjunction with property transfers. The Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) provides underwriting commitment to loans for multi-unit
dwellings only if the lenders have conducted an environmental assessment
of the property.' In addition, lenders for non-residential commercial
property frequently require audits as a condition for loan approval."
However, further investigation is required to determine to what extent
collection of this information leads to actual cleanup.
In cases of large industrial operations, the buyers themselves are likely
to assume the primary role as gatekeeper. This is because some of the
very large industrial deals are self-financed. If a lender is involved in
such transactions, the lender's risk is somewhat lessened by the fact that
the industrial borrower is sufficiently large to cover potential environmental liabilities. In these cases it is more likely that the internal policies
of the buyer will determine the degree of monitoring and the terms of
agreements about potential cleanup and damage costs.'
The effectiveness of both buyers and lenders as gatekeepers depends
on whether they perceive themselves as being held responsible for cleanup
costs and damages. Buyers and lenders have a strong motivation to assess
20. McMahon, Lender Perspectives on Hazardous Waste and Similar Liabilities, 18 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10. 368-71 (Sept. 1988).
21. See e.g. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20.992 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4. 1985); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). A

discussion of these cases and others is found in James, FinancialInstitutionsand Hazardous Waste
Litigation: Limiting the Exposure to Superfund Liability 28 Nat. Res. J.329 (1988).
22. Current Practices Review, supra note 17, at 13.
23. Personal conversations with Tom Duffey and Dean Buss of Camp, Dresser and McKee; Alan
Kibler and Bat Jermond of Law Environmental, and Steve Poltorzycke of Arthur D. Little (Sept.

1988.).
24. Personal conversations with Jim Guston of Law Environmental and Steve Poltorzycke of
Arthur D. Little (Oct. 1988).
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the extent of environmental contamination prior io sale. However, if they
believe the damage is too small to actually trigger federal enforcement
action, or if they believe they can evade cleanup and damage costs via
such protection mechanisms as indemnification, they will lack motivation
to ensure actual cleanup.
Finally, the possibility of buyers and lenders sharing the benefits of
polluting activities may compromise their effectiveness as gatekeepers.
The willingness of sellers to pass along benefits such as a reduced sale
price decreases gatekeeping incentives, particularly if the reduced sale
price outweighs expected liability.
In addition to incentive problems, reliance on a gatekeeper strategy to
promote socially desirable site cleanup has a further limitation. Such a
strategy can be effective only for property that is put on the market for
sale and, therefore, comes under the purview of buyers or lenders. The
higher the turnover in ownership of sites, the greater the potential effectiveness of gatekeeper liability. If a site is contaminated to the extent that
the costs of cleanup exceed the profits from sale, its owner may choose
to hold on to the site indefinitely. Therefore, the worst sites may not be
affected by gatekeeper liability.
CERCLA can provide strong incentives to mitigate the effects of past
contamination and to prevent future contamination. Nevertheless, there
is reason to think that some sites may remain unmitigated and that incentives to prevent future damage may be weak in some situations. The
state of New Jersey has established a direct regulatory program linked to
property sales. The next section describes the implementation of the New
Jersey ECRA.
PROPERTY TRANSFERS UNDER ECRA
New Jersey's ECRA went into effect in January 1984.' ECRA does
not replace Superfund, but defines property transfer requirements that
supplement the liability established by federal legislation. ECRA establishes as a precondition to real property transfer that every industrial
establishment undergo cleanup, if necessary. Our discussion of the effects
of ECRA refers to that program in conjunction with Superfund, since the
federal liability rules are still relevant. 6 ECRA applies to establishments
25. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Hazardous Waste Management. 1988
ECRA Progress Report (1988) (hereinafter ECRA 1988 Reportl.
26. Although ECRA applies to closures as well as property transfers, in this study we will only
discuss the case of property transfers. Id. at 5. It should also be noted that ECRA applies to only
one subcategory of property covered by CERCLA, CERCLA liability is not limited to any category
of property. Therefore environmental problems discovered at commercial, residential, or public sites,
as well as industrial sites are subject to Superfund liability rules. Such environmental problems as
leaking underground storage tanks at retail service stations in New Jersey are not subject to ECRA
regulations, which apply only to industrial sites. Id. Like CERCLA, ECRA applies both to on-site
contamination and any contamination of neighboring property that originates at the site.
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falling into certain major Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories, primarily industrial facilities. In addition, the industrial establishments must be engaged in operations involving the generation,
manufacture, refining, transportation, treatment, storage, handling, or
disposal of hazardous substances and wastes. Finally, the industrial establishments must be closing or transferring the ownership of the property
or business, or causing the business to cease operations. All three conditions must be present for ECRA to apply."
ECRA mandates that a site be free of contamination at the time that
ownership is transferred.' Under ECRA, the seller is required either to
submit a "negative declaration," certifying that the site is free of environmental problems, or to develop a remediation plan for the site." This
cleanup plan must be approved by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) prior to settlement. 0 The seller must
provide financial assurance that the cleanup will be completed. 3' If the
seller does not comply with ECRA, it is strictly liable for all cleanup and

removal costs.3 NJDEP oversees all phases of the cleanup plan until it
is completed, and is empowered to draw upon the seller's financial assurance if the seller fails to initiate or complete the work as specified."
In addition, ECRA has two severe sanctions designed to induce compli-

ance: (1) the buyer or the NJDEP may void the sale of the property if
the seller does not comply, and (2) the state may recover penalties and
damages of up to $25,000 per day.'
Between January 1, 1984 and June 30, 1988, over 2,200 ECRA cases

were resolved-meaning that they reached the point of receiving either
a negative declaration or an approved cleanup plan and were therefore
cleared for sale.3" Sixty-three million dollars have either been spent on
cleanup or posted in the form of bonds to assure the availability of cleanup
funds for the 2,200 resolved sites.' An additional 2,100 cases were still
active, having not yet received either a negative declaration or approved

cleanup plan."7

27. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-8. 9 & II (West 1989). See also ECRA 1988 Report, supra
note 25, at 5.
28. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-i.
29. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-9,
30. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 268-51(c) (1987).
31. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 13:IK-9(a)(2).

32. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:lK-13(a).
33. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7. §§ 268:6.2(e).
34. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-13. See also ECRA 1988 Report, supra note 25, at 5.
35. Information provided by Terni Smith of the Bureau of Environmental Evaluation and Cleanup
Responsibility Assessment (Sept. 1988).
36. Id.
37. Information provided by Terri Smith of the Bureau of Environmental Evaluation and Cleanup
Responsibility Assessment (Oct. 1988)
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While ECRA has induced a significant amount of actual or planned
cleanup, the program has also imposed significant costs. All of the sites
that are deemed to fall under the purview of ECRA are required to have
an environmental audit, although not all of these audits require testing."'
ECRA also requires payment of fees to the NJDEP.39 These fees fund
New Jersey's oversight role in the cleanup process, which had a budget
of about $5 million in fiscal year 1988.' The fees do not cover the actual
audit and cleanup costs.
ECRA fees vary significantly, depending on the extent of the audit and
the amount of cleanup required." For example, a site that requires an
audit without any sampling is estimated to incur a fee of $1,600.2 A site
that requires an audit that includes groundwater monitoring and a cleanup
of $500,000 is estimated to incur fees of $20, 100." If these companies
were small businesses (defined as fewer than 100 full time employees),
the estimated fees would be reduced to $250 and $18,850, respectively.
Delays related to the ECRA rules impose additional costs. From its
start, ECRA has had problems with backlogs of cases and has been
criticized for delays." Although the program has greatly expanded and
delays have been reduced, they are still an important factor. ECRA cases
are divided into three categories: high environmental concern (HEC),
medium environmental concern (MEC), and low environmental concern
(LEC). It currently takes a minimum of 18 months to clear an HEC case,
an average of six months to clear an MEC case, and 60-90 days for an
LEC case.'
Delays may be reduced by obtaining extensions, or by obtaining an
Administrative Consent Order (ACO). ACOs were designed to circumvent
the problems caused by ECRA delays. Under an ACO the seller enters
a legal agreement with the NJDEP that he or she will comply with ECRA

and must provide financial assurance equal to the estimated level of the
cleanup.' NJDEP estimates cleanup costs from the site and site history
38. Information provided by Joseph Fallon. Chief. Bureau of Environmental Evaluation and
Cleanup Responsibility Assessment (Nov. 1988)
39. ECRA 1988 Report, supra note 25, at 7.

40. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, §268:1:10 (1987).
41. In calculating these fees, we assume that the following fees would apply: $1.400 for the
initial review notice and $200 forthe negative declaration review. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 268:1:10.
42. In calculating these fees, we assumed that the following fees would apply: $5,400 for initial
notice review with a sampling plan including groundwater monitoring. $500 sampling plan data
review, $6,000 to review the cleanup plan, $8,000 to oversee the cleanup, and $200 for the negative
declaration review. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 268:1:10.
43. Olson, ECRA: New Jersey's Cleanup Statute, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtil. L. Inst.) 10,395-99
(1987).
44, T. Smith, supra note 35.
7, § 26:b-7.
45. N.J. Admin. Code tit.

46. ECRA 1988 Report, supra note 25, at 13.
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information applicants provide. Once the ACO is signed, the transaction
may be completed. A fee of $1,000 is charged for ACO applications, and
the average processing time for them is three weeks.'
Although an ACO allows a transaction to proceed, final disposal of
.the ECRA application can take years in some cases. Such delays greatly
complicate the industrial real estate market where transactions are traditionally made in a 60-day period.' Unfortunately, a recent study of
these delays was flawed by failure to account for administrative consent
orders.' 9 A careful assessment of the costs ECRA imposes on property
transfers must reflect administrative practices that ameliorate delays.
COMPARISON OF STRUCTURE AND INCENTIVES UNDER
SUPERFUND AND ECRA
An apparent difference between Superfund and ECRA is the locus of
the incentive to investigate potential environmental problems. Under ECRA
the seller is required to investigate the extent of the environmental damage
and is held liable for damages and cleanup costs. Under Superfund, buyers
and lenders have the incentive to investigate in order to protect themselves
from liability. In reality, however, both the buyer and the seller may have
an incentive to investigate the extent of environmental damage under both
sets of rules.
While the seller has the responsibility of conducting the required ECRA
audit, it is in the seller's interest for the audit to reveal that the site is
clean. In order to ensure that the audit is objective or accurate, the buyer
or the lender may hire his/her own environmental consultant to verify the
results of the seller's audit. An accurate environmental assessment is
important to buyers and lenders because ECRA approval does not absolve
them from future liability. Some lenders in New Jersey contract for a
verification directly, or require the buyer to do this as a condition of the
loan.-'

Under Superfund, buyers and lenders are motivated to conduct environmental assessments to protect themselves from liability; however, sellers may wish to conduct their own audits prior to putting the property
up for sale. This allows them to assess the extent of the environmental
damage and to conduct a cleanup in advance of sale, if desired. This
strategy may prevent sellers from having to make costly concessions to
buyers in the form of indemnification, a reduction in price, or a fast
47. Guston. supra note 24.
48. D. Marino & M. Jurkat. Land Use Impacts of New Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act Legislation in Urban Industrial Transition Areas, Department of Management, Proj. 12,
Stevens Institute of Technology (1989).
49. Fallon, supra note 38.

50. Guston. supra note 24.
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cleanup at the time of sale. That type of behavior is especially likely at
industrial5 sites, when the seller suspects the presence of environmental
damage. '
ECRA is a direct regulatory approach unlike Superfund, which relies
on voluntary actions motivated by liability concerns. ECRA requires
sellers to meet specified information and cleanup standards. Cleanups
under ECRA are subject to the approval and supervision of the NJDEP. 52
In transfers not subject to ECRA, but in which the buyer and/or lender
are motivated to protect themselves from potential liability under Superfund, no external authority requires or supervises a cleanup. This leaves
more leeway for sellers, buyers, and lenders to work out their own solutions to environmental concerns. When an environmental problem is
discovered, negotiations between the involved parties may result in a
variety of solutions, including a division of liabilities based on the results
of a site investigation, an indemnification for all or part of the environmental liability costs, a reduction in the price of the property, or the
creation of a source of funds to cover future environmental liability.
Both Superfund and ECRA may create an incentive to retain highly
contaminated sites. If the estimated cost of cleanup exceeds the gains
from the sale of the property, then it may be in the seller's interest to
hold onto the site rather than conduct a cleanup and sell the property.
Conversely, knowledge of contamination could motivate owners to sell
property sooner than they otherwise would. Such a response would be
rational if future cleanup costs were expected to rise and contamination
could be concealed from potential buyers and state officials. However,
such an attempt to evade cleanup costs is not likely to succeed because
liability may not be sold under CERCLA and an ECRA approval does
not exempt the seller from future liability.
The institutional complexity of these two programs tends to obscure
comparisons of advantages and disadvantages. The following section
describes a somewhat simplified, formal framework for comparing their
net benefits.
A FRAMEWORK FOR QUANTIFYING NET BENEFITS
Both ECRA and Superfund have effectively changed the legal and
economic context of commercial and industrial property transactions. The
ideal approach for evaluating the impact of these changes would be to
5 I. ECRA 1988 Report, supra note 25. at 7. Under ECRA parties are required to cleanup according
to standards identified by the state. However, buyers or sellers engaged in cleanup to avoid future
Superud liability are not subject to any oversight. Therefore, there is less assurance that a total
cleanup is undertaken.
52. Deadweight losses are costs incurred without any offsetting benefits. H. Varian. Intermediate
Microeconomics 291 (1990).
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quantify the net benefits of actual regulatory programs. Initially, it would
be useful to identify differences in the regulatory regimes that might lead
to unambiguous qualitative differences in net benefits. Such a comparison
is undertaken here as a means of identifying areas for future research.
With some simplification, the following model captures important differences between the Superfund and ECRA programs. Let subscripts s
and e refer respectively to Superfund and ECRA. Designate the probability that a given commercial or industrial site will be sold in a given
period in the absence of hazardous waste regulations as iro. Let the
probabilities that the same site will be sold under Superfund and ECRA
regulations be n, and rre, respectively. Such a transaction will occur if
the joint, private net benefits to the buyer, seller, and lender, 0, are
greater than cleanup and transactions costs. Hence the values of r, and
7r, are functions of these costs. To simplify notation these arguments are
suppressed in the following discussion. Designate the conditional probabilities that the site will subsequently be cleaned up under each program
as p, and pc.
The expected cost of cleanup is then
(1) rrprC,(q,f,)
for r = s,e
where cleanup cost, C,, is a function of the total amount of waste at or
emanating from the site, q, and the fraction f, that is cleaned up. The
extent to which the programs precipitate actual cleanups also differs. The
more stringent regulatory requirements of ECRA should cause p, < p,
= I (if q exceeds some maximum standard). Assume for the present that
ECRA results in cleanup to the given standard, while Superfund may
yield less than complete cleanup under some circumstances, so that f,
-- f= = I.
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Total expected private costs to all parties to the transaction, CP,, also
include expected transactions costs, T,(q',p,r), and deadweight losses
4
related to deterred sales.
(2) C1, = irp,C,(q,f,) + "rT,(q',p,)+ (ni--,
where T, < T, and q' is the expected amount of waste. Transactions costs
vary with q' because monitoring requirements are stricter for sites with
a history that indicates a potential problem. Environmental audits are a
requirement under ECRA and are commonplace under Superfund as well. 5
53. Personal conversations with Tom Duffey and Dean Buss of Camp, Dresser and McKee; Alan
Kibler and Ban Jennond of Law Environmental; and Steve Poltorzycke of Arthur D. Uttle (Sept.
1988). We abstract from such complicating factors as the toxicity of the particular waste, the nature
of the exposure paths, and how many people are exposed.
54. Supra note 42. Parties to a transaction under Superfund are not required to report information
on contamination or cleanup activities to either state or federal agencies.
55. See, e.g., Harris & Raviv, Some Resultson Incentive Contracts withApplicarionsto Education
and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 20-30 (1978);
B. Holmstrom, On the Theory of Delegation in Bayesian Models in Economic Theory (M. Boyer
& R. Kihlstrom, eds. 1984).
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In addition to audit costs, ECRA requires fees to be paid to the state
of New Jersey and generates costs through delays and additional paperwork requirements. The costs of such delays can be significant. These
costs are larger if cleanup actually takes place, so transactions costs are
also a function of the probability of cleanup. The fact that both cleanup
and transactions costs are likely to be higher under ECRA implies that
Expected unmitigated damage, U, from environmental exposure to
hazardous waste at or emanating from the site arises when regulations
deter a sale and cleanup that otherwise would have taken place, and when
a sale takes place but no cleanup occurs or cleanup is incomplete.
(3) U, = (Or - ir,)p,'D(q) + r,.(l - p,)'D(q) + ir.p'(l - f,)'D(q)
where monetized damages D are a function of the quantity of waste. 6
Assuming that p. = fC = 1, the second and third terms are equal to
zero for ECRA.
The-expected social benefit, B, of each regulatory program is the sum
of external benefits.
(4) B, = ir'p,fD(q) + ir,.V,
and V, is the social value of information about exposure. Information
about the quantity and nature of the wastes at a site and exposure patterns

may enable affected individuals to take evasive or mitigating action to
reduce damages. If such actions are undertaken, then such information

is valuable. Both Superfund and ECRA appear to be successful in generating information about potential environmental contamination problems at the time of property transfer. An important difference is that this

information is made public as part of a regulatory process under ECRA,
but may remain confidential under* Superfund." Assume for simplicity
that environmental audit data is not made public under Superfund regulations, so that V. > V, = 0.

Administrative or enforcement costs have not been explicitly modeled.
ECRA is financed by the fees collected under the program. Including the

administrative costs would result in a double-counting of costs. Superfund
liability concerns do not entail any direct administrative costs; however,
aggressive enforcement efforts at existing NPL sites increase the probability that liability concerns will motivate cleanup at non-NPL sites during
property transfers. For the purposes of this analysis, assume that the level

of enforcement effort at NPL sites is independent of the secondary benefits
of the cleanup induced at non-NPL sites, and that it is not possible to

attribute a share of these enforcement costs to those secondary benefits.
56. We abstract from such complicating factors as the toxicity of the particular waste, the nature
of the exposure paths, and how many people are exposed.
57. Parties to a transaction under Superfund are not required to report information on contamination
or cleanup activities to either state or federal agencies.
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TABLE I
Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Programs Affecting Real Estate Transactions

Private net benefits of sale
External benefit of cleanup
Private deadweight losses
Unmitigated external damage

Superfund

ECRA

a - C, - T.
f:D
(a.- ,0
I(%.- ir)p.
+ 7,rlI -pflD

0 - C, -T.,
D + V.
(Wf.-N.)O
(w.- wYD

Suwerfund <> ECRA
>
<
<
>(?)

Table 1 compares the various components of net social benefit between
programs and indicates likely relative magnitudes. The relative magnitudes are unambiguous for private net benefits, deadweight losses, and
external benefits from cleanup. Private net benefits must be positive in
order for a sale to take place, and for identical properties, cleanup costs
are at least as large under ECRA as under Superfund, while transactions
costs are clearly greater under ECRA. External benefits of a cleanup are
higher under ECRA than Superfund because under ECRA a full cleanup
is required (f, = ) and information about the extent of contamination is
made available to the public.
Given the assumptions, the relative magnitudes of unmitigated damage
under ECRA and Superfund are ambiguous. Unmitigated damage occurs
under ECRA only when the costs of the ECRA program discourage sales
from taking place. In contrast, unmitigated damage has three sources
under the Superfund program: discouraged sales, sales with no cleanup,
and sales with partial cleanup. Although the relative magnitudes are ambiguous, it is likely that unmitigated damage is greater under Superfund
unless the level of discouraged sales is quite large under ECRA.
This analysis indicates that private costs are unambiguously higher
under ECRA, but that external benefits of a given cleanup are greater as
well. In addition, it is quite likely that unmitigated damages are less under
ECRA. Although this provides a clear picture of how the two programs
compare on costs and benefits individually, the fundamental questions as
to which program has greater net benefits is ambiguous. In short, it appears
impossible to evaluate which program is more efficient without empirical
estimates.
While this study provides some insights into the effects of liability
under ECRA and Superfund on commercial and industrial property transfers, it clearly raises more questions than it answers. Resolving these
questions will require gathering data on the value of damages avoided
through cleanup and full cost information, including costs of environmental audits, legal costs, cleanup costs, fees, delay costs, and infor-
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mation on the number of transactions discouraged because of potential
cleanup and transactions costs. The amount of cleanup actually resulting
from Superfund liability concerns is another important area for further
investigation.
Although the information requirements of a complete analysis of the
costs and benefits associated with Superfund and ECRA are severe, further
analysis is possible. This study relied on available data, published articles
and phone interviews with environmental auditors. While environmental
auditors were useful in identifying the types of information being collected
at the time of property transfers and the key players requesting this
information, they provided only limited insight into what types of deals
were being made based on audit information. Additional attempts to gather
information on the extent to which liability concerns under Superfund
are resulting in actual cleanup might utilize interviews with attorneys
involved in commercial and industrial property closings.
This study has not addressed the effect of these programs on waste
generators who alter their behavior in anticipation of a future sale of the
property. Neither has it specifically discussed possible regulatory concerns
with environmental auditors, although they have been given increasing
responsibility under both programs. The principal-agent literature indicates potential problems of structuring incentives and monitoring compliance of such agents."8 Both of these issues are important areas for
future investigation.
A future study might also develop case studies for comparable industrial
sites in New Jersey and in states without ECRA requirements. These case
studies would compare both costs incurred and actual cleanup that takes
place, and might provide insight into the impact of delays under ECRA.
The ECRA program creates a wealth of information on transactions in
New Jersey, including all the transactions that take place for property
potentially under the purview of ECRA as well as information on the
actual cleanup required at these sites. This information could form the
basis for an evaluation of the net benefits of the program. Performing a
similar analysis on sites in other states lacking comparable information
on transactions could pose a greater challenge.
The many contaminated sites in the United States and the time and
money it has taken to clean them up under the Superfund program indicate
that there are large potential gains from motivating private agents to
undertake such cleanup on their own. Superfund's liability rules may be
one way of achieving this goal. However, New Jersey has chosen to
supplement Superfund liability with a regulatory approach requiring industrial site owners to undertake necessary cleanups prior to the sale of
58. See, e.g., supra nae 55.
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the property. The analysis indicates that both the extent of cleanup and
the magnitude of the costs will be higher under ECRA than under Superfund alone because cleanup is actually required under ECRA. Without
ECRA, buyers and sellers may negotiate such mutually advantageous
solutions as indemnification schemes or discounting the selling price.
Costs are even higher under ECRA because of the additional delays and
fees caused by state involvement in the transaction. ECRA may also
discourage sales from occurring in New Jersey.
While the framework presented here highlights the differences between
Superfund and ECRA and identifies additional benefits and costs associated with the New Jersey program, these benefits and costs have not
been quantified. Quantification is necessary to assess whether additional
benefits more than compensate for additional costs under ECRA. A complete assessment of ECRA and Superfund awaits further research to estimate the net benefits of each approach.

